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ARAB GULF STATES IN WORLD PERSPECfiVE: AREA, 
POPULATION, GNP 
The Arab countries of the Gulf occupy the whole length of the Gulf West Coast. It is at 
the same time the Eastern parts of the Arabian peninsula. Geographically southern Iraq 
should be included in this Arab region, much as we include the whole of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. Yet geography and politics in Iraq accounted for excluding it from the 
treaty creating, in 1981, the Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 
(CCASG) which is better known as the Gulf Co-operation Council (G.C.C.) 
Thus the G.C.C. is composed of six Arab Gulf countries which could be really 
sub-divided into the lesser and bigger Gulf States. The lesser States are all less than 
100,000 km2. Actually, there are huge differences of area even among the lesser Gulf 
states. If we assume Bahrain equals 1, Qatar would be 18.3, Kuwait 28.6, and the United 
Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) 134.4. Needless to say that Oman is a giant in comparison with 
the lesser States, but still dwarfed by Saudi Arabia which attains the 12th rank among 
world States. (Table 1) 
Table 2 gives the unfamiliar reader with the Gulf region a clue as to the areal potential 
(economic & strategic) in comparison with more familiar countries of the world. 
TABLE 1 
G.C.C. Countries: Area and Population (1985)(1) (1988)<2 ) 
COIIDiry Area Population (,OliO's) p~ Tot. Pop. 
,OOOkm' Total Natlonllls hpats Ezpats un. powth 
Bahrain 1985 0.62' 424 276 158 37 5.12 
1988 450 297 153 34 4.7 
Kuwait 1985 17.8 1625 682 943 58 3.35 
1988 1960 784 1176 60 4.8 
Oman 1985 212.4c 1293+ 973 323 25 5.46 
1988 1520 1034 486 32 3.1 
Qatar 1985 11.4 241+ 115 126 52 3.08 
1988 370 120 251 68 5.5 
U.A.E. 1985 83.6s 1116 403 713 64 2.67 
1988 1500 375 1125 75 3.4 
Sub. Tot.! 1985 325.8 4699 2449 Z263 48 
191111 5800 2610 3191 55 
Saudi Arabia 1985 2149.7 12642+ 8764 3919 31 5.53 
1988 12460 7480 4980 40 3.0 
Total 1985 2475.5 17341 11213 6111Z 35 
191111 111260 10090 8171 45 
1) Population figures after AI· Hamad A.Y., 'Economic Changes and Future Development in the Arab Gulf, pp 34 & 36 in 
At Taawun Quarterly, Jan. 1988, Riyad. These figures are based on ECW A and other official figures released by the GCC 
governments. These are widely quoted in current literature of the region. Some figures needs validation, especially in 
countries where no census were ever conducted, but for practical purposes these figures and other GCC estimations are 
widely accepted. Only specific demographic researches can investigate deeper in this matter. 
+) Countries where no census were taken, yet there are certain estimates based on official sample studies drawn by statistical 
offices of the respective governments as well as international agencies, e.g., ECW A. In March 1986 Qatar conducted its 
first general census with nearly 30% increase above the previous population estimates. 
') 685 km2 in other sources. 
C) 300,000 km in the Omani official sources. 
S) This is the U.N. figure, while in other sources it is only n,ooo km2• 
2) Gulf International Bank, 'Gulf Economic & Financial Report', Bahrain, vol. IV, Dec. 1989. 
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TABLE 2 
Area and Population Comparisons (1990) 
GlllfStates Area in Pop. in Comparable Area in Pop. in 
........ 
·-
States ........ 
·-Bahrain 0.622 0.57 Singapore 0.618 2.67 0.49 
Kuwait 17.8 1.8 Fiji 18.2 0.73 
2.0 
Oman 212.4 1.2 
1.4 
United Kingdom 244.0 57.22 
Qatar 11.4 0.47 Lebanon 10.4 2.89 
0.42 
U.A.E. 83.6 1.9 Austria 83.8 7.6 
1.8 
Saudi Arabia 2149.7 13.7 
13.6 
Mexico 1958.0 84.3 
N.B.: Upper pop. figures for the Gulf States after Fergani, quoted by Al-Qaryouti 1987, while lower figures are after 
Encyclopaedia Universalis 1990, also pop. figures of comparable States after same source. 
Because the Gulf region is part of the world's greatest arid zone, mere figures of how 
many square kilometres may not be significant (except in future potentials and defence 
capabilities). Thus Bahrain and Singapore are area-wise similar, but the population of 
Singapore is around six and half times that of Bahrain. The meagreness of the Gulf 
population has its origin in the past resource scarcity of the desert environment. The 
present Gulf population is dependant on the new economic order generated by oil wealth 
since the fifties of this century, which, among other things, produced a high factor of 
immigrant expatriates within the population content of Gulf countries. 
Because of the thin population of the Gulf States - nationals and non-nationals 
together - the per capita GNP is among the highest in the world. Though this is an 
unreal distribution of the GNP on every citizen and/or resident in any one country, yet it 
gives a clue to the general wealth of a society. Table 3 illustrates the GNP issue and 
related subjects. 
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TABLE 3 
GNP indicators in the GCC and comparable States 
State GNPTollll Per C.pitll Real Growth 
Bn. $ GNP(,-$) 
"" 1973 "" 1980 1983 19116 
A) G.C.C. States: 
Bahrain 1981 3.4 7.59 
1987 4.1 9.65 0.8 Kuwait 1981 32.4 22.53 
1987 29.4 14.87 0.3 
-0.9 Oman 1981 5.7 6.25 
1987 7.7 5.76 3.6 5.7 Qatar 1981 6.6 27.80 
1987 4.1 12.36 8.5 U.A.E. 1981 28.1 25.81 
1987 22.8 15.68 
-1.0 3.8 ~udi Arabia 1981 121.5 13.00 
1986 83.3 6.92 1.7 3.4 
B) Selected Western Companble States: 
Luxemburg 1981 3.8 10.54 
1986 6.7 17.3 2.2 4.1 Belgium 1981 95.5 9.65 
1986 112.0 11.25 1.4 0.9 Netherland 1981 140.5 9.86 
1986 175.3 10.0 0.7 1.0 
Figures for 1981 after "Atlas Economique Mondial" 1984. Other figures after 'Fischer 1990'. All figures based on several 
sources, e.g., World Bank, OECD, EEC, etc. with some recalculations due to difficulty of assessment and rates of exchange. 
However the 1987 figures of the GuH countries are derived from Encyclopaedia Universalis 1990. 
The selected western countries in table 3 are based on comparable data in certain 
aspects, e.g., population and GNP. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg is within the range 
of Bahrain or Qatar, but its economic structure is not dependant on one major source of 
income - i.e. oil exports in the case of the Gulf States. 
The same applies to Belgium whose population compares with conservative estimates 
of Saudi population, and their GNP totals are also similar. The Netherland usually 
surpasses Saudia*, and combined with Belgium they are constantly circa 150% of the 
cumulative GNP of all GCC states. It is obvious that the rise and fall of the Gulf GNP, 
which is dominated by oil export earnings, is in sharp contrast to the more stable and 
varied economy represented in this case by the Benelux countries. However, one must 
not forget that Holland and Belgium share in the world oil economy - benefiting from 
their location as a trans-shipment and entrepot of oil imports of the highly industrialised 
Rhine-Ruhr region. 
• 'Saudia' is the common reference in Arabic usages to the 'Kingdom of Saudi Arabia'. In the present paper both appellations, 
i.e., 'Saudi Arabia' and 'Saudia' would be used freely to denote the one and the same country. 
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The purpose of this discussion is to show that the much propagated picture in the 
Western media about the Arabs piling up world money and bank and industry assets, 
contained a heavy political distortion. The GCC states in their totality hardly compare 
with a small western nation such as the Netherlands. Furthermore, the economic 
structure is imbalanced in the Gulf - a situation which is, more or less, due to 
arrangements of world economy rather than local policies alone. For instance the 
dramatic increase of oil price in the late 70's- early 80's were not OPEC pricing policies 
alone. Though it came as a world shock, it was already motivated and was accepted by 
big oil companies and the western financial and economic world. "The $2-a barrel price 
was an artificial price politically and economically". (l) oil prices needed indixation to 
world inflation. 
THE G.C.C. FROM WITHIN 
Several tables in this chapter indicate the previous classification of the G.C.C. into 
lesser and greater states, i.e., Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates 
(U .A. E.) as the lesser States vis-a-vis Oman and Saudia as the greater ones. But tables 5 
to 8 assert yet another classification; Saudi strength in area, population and economy 
single out Saudia as the leading partner in the Gulf Cooperation Council. This underlines 
the role and commitment Saudia had to shoulder in many political aspects, e.g., regional 
and internal security. The following themes try to analyse several Gulf and GCC 
situations with special reference to Saudi role whenever it is deemed necessary. 
Area, Location and Strategic Importance: 
The cumulative area of the G.C.C. equals one quarter of the area of the U.S.A., or 
one and half times the area of Iran, or ten times that of the U.K. 
Saudia occupies 87% of the total G.C.C. area, and as thus has a land potential several 
times that of the other Gulf members. These are as much future potentials as they are 
present ones. It is illustrated in the build-up of the State as an economic, demographic 
and military power in the Arabian peninsula. 
Population-wise, Saudia has around 13 million inhabitants, natives and expatriates, 
which is not in itself a big figure, but all the same represents 69% of the G.C.C. 
population. The dispersal of Saudi people over several areas along the two vital axis<2> is 
of strategic importance in comparison with the centralised population in the capital 
metropolitan areas of the lesser Gulf States- making them strategically vulnerable. 
The extension of Saudi landmass to the Red Sea and the Gulf is the originator of 
strategic Saudi role in the area, and presupposes a definite military role other than the 
lesser G.C.C. members. The Red Sea politics dominated the best part of a century; 
1870-1970, and especially affecting the politics of Egypt, Great Britain (at the time), 
USA-Israel (present politics) and naturally Saudia which controls 80% of the Red Sea 
eastern coast, but strategically caught in between Suez to the North and Aden to the 
South. 
The Gulf seaway, as a linguistic border between Arabic and Iranian, has had its 
tensions, wars and trade rivalries in the past. The emergence of the Arab Gulf states and 
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oil geopolitics in the 70's, gave birth to an ever increasing importance of the region along 
with more Arab Iran rivalry. <3> During the 60's and 70's the U.S. politics considered Iran 
the Gulf strongman and enhanced that position to complement Israel, the other 
strongman in the Middle East. But this American myth failed its test, especially when a 
radical change befell the Iranian shield. The outbreak of the first Gulf war between Iraq 
and Iran during most of the 80's prompted the structuring of the Cooperation Council of 
the Arab Gulf States (for shortening it is the G.C.C.). 
There is a Saudi Red Sea politics. But it is not- at present- as articulate as its Gulf, 
i.e. G .C.C. politics. The reason may be that there are many powerful partners in the Red 
Sea geo-strategies. The same may have applied to the Gulf strategies till the late 70's, 
where Iran, Iraq and Saudia played nearly equal parts of a local Gulf balance. With the 
break of the Gulf war the Gulf strategic balance was disturbed and Saudia, the remaining 
big partner in the Gulf, sensed that she is yet to be tested in the conflict for supremacy or 
co-existence in the Gulf. This is attested by the sudden soaring Saudi military 
expenditure after the downfall of the Iranian Shield and the start of the Gulf War<4> (See 
table 7). 
The lesser Gulf States share Saudia's Gulf politics by necessity of their location on the 
Gulf shores. Locational differences are responsible for a variety of political modus 
operandi. Thus Kuwait on the head of the Gulf has to modulate its politics vis-a-vis Iraqi 
and Iranian neighbours, while Qatar and Bahrain have definitely centre location 
implications. Oman with its free water front on the Indian Ocean has another set of 
problems; being the real gateway of G.C.C. oil to outer world it has definite defence and 
military tasks in the strait of Hormuz and the Indian strategic zone<5>. 
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TABLE 4 
Population and Labour Force: 
Estimates for 1985<1>, 1987<2> and latest census figures<3> 
Pol.ulation Labour Force 
Tollll atiollllls % Natiollllls Tollll Natiollllls % Natiollllls 
(,000) (,000) (,000) (,000) 
Bahrain 1) 578 293 51 151 70 46 
2) 430 301 70 
3) 350 (81) 238 68 
Kuwait 1) 1817 663 36 414 140 34 
2) 1870 670 36 
3) 1697 (85) 
Oman 1) 1283 1010 79 257 150 58 
2) 1190 892 75 
Qatar 1) 474 78 17 136 19 14 
2) 371 74-92 20-25 
3) 371 (86) 
U.A.E. 1) 1961 295 15 632 63 10 
2) tno 440-530 250-30 
3) 1622 (85) 
Saudi Arabia 1) 13711 8757 64 3245 1565 48 
2) 13610 9500 70 
Tollll 1) 198U 11096 56 41135 Z006 41 
2) 19241 11877-11975 61-62 
Sources: 
1) AI-Qaryouti, M.Q., 1987, quoting N. Fergani projection of population (based in tum on Sergaeln et al "Manpower and 
International Labour Migration" in Middle East and North Africa). 
2) Fischer 1989. 
3) Middle East and North Africa 1987. 
Inhabitants of the G.C.C. Countries: 
The population situation and food production in the G.C.C. region are its weak points 
and have to balance to its needs from outside sources. The reason for both situations is 
the same: the area is part of the severe arid zone which permits only a small biotic 
pyramid. With the new oil wealth - which started in the fifties and took off in the mid 
seventies - new frontiers were pushing the region to a sudden internal change, growth 
and development, and towards unforetold external cultural and technological world 
contacts. The modern State machinery emerged to better contain and fulfil these 
changes. 
The first State task was to build up national administrative and technical cadre. Since 
education and training takes its time - nearly a generation - the interim period has to 
be filled by expatriates hired by the State or private sector (with governments controlling 
residency permits). 
Expatriates could be historically and vocationally traced in the following major 
outline: 
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1. The British expats, as former administrators, continue up to now, but with U.S. and 
Western participation, as the upper technical heirarchy in financial, industrial and 
consulting fields. 
2. Iranian plateau dwellers, incorporating Persians, Baluchi and Afghani as well as 
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arabicised Iranians of the Gulf coast. These people, by feographic proximity are the 
oldest expatriates with contacts well into pre-oil times<6 • They control several crafts 
and professions; masons, carpenters, boat repair and building, petty <:;ommerce 
especially of material, cloth, groceries, pipe-fitters, petty car repairs, gardening, 
watchmen, etc. 
3. Arab expatriates: 
3a. Inter-Gulf: Bahrainies, due to earlier clerical abilities and denser population, 
were readily posted in several oil-rich neighbouring countries, especially Saudia 
and Qatar. Omanis were also abound in richer Gulf countries due to political 
persecution in Oman prior to 1970, and to late oil discoveries in Oman, also in 
1970. Many of them went home due to better opportunities in their countries. 
3b. Southern Arabs, i.e. Yemenies (at large) by sheer proximity and long tradition of 
migration, came, invited or not, to occupy a big variety of professions from 
military to banking. Most Yemenies prefer Saudia for its size and opportunities. 
3c. Palestinians: The emergence of Gulf oil riches coincided with the Palestinian 
exodus following the 1948 wars with Israel. For many reasons Arab and 
international agencies gave the refugees the basic education and vocational 
training which enabled them to fill in middle class posts in the Gulf e.g. primary 
school teachers, clerks in both public and private sectors, petty enterprises and 
brokers, etc. Later on the highly educated Palestinians occupied directive jobs in 
government and private offices. 
3d. Egyptians: At the start in the 1960's they came - mostly seconded by the 
Egyptian Government- to occupy high technical and expertise posts, e.g. high 
school teachers, university professors, medical doctors, engineers, architects, 
consultants, etc. In the mid 70's another wave of Egyptian expatriates came in 
greater numbers and covered areas of skilled and unskilled labour needed in 
mechanical, electrical and agricultural professions. Many of them left or are in 
process of leaving with economic recession. 
3e. Other Arabs: Iraqis, mostly in Kuwait, Syro-Lebanese majority in Saudi, 
Jordano-Palestinians all over Gulf mostly hired in the armed forces. Sudanese 
and Somalis also working in police and army forces in most of the Gulf. Tunisians 
and Moroccans recently came according to agreements between their respective 
governments and the Gulf (a strategy of balancing sources of the labour force). 
4. Indian Sub-continent: includes Indians, Pakistanis, Bangalis and Sri Lankans. For a 
long time the sea-faring Gulf people had contacts with India and East Africa. The 
Indian culture zone is not alien to the Gulf and during the British Empire, the Gulf 
administration was directly supervised by the Bombay British government. The 
Indians, i.e. all expatriates from the sub-continent, are numerically the strongest 
community in the Gulf. Indeed in certain cases, e.g. the U.A.E., they may be equal to 
all other inhabitants, local and expats together. The Indians occupy all kinds of jobs 
from technology to manual domestic work, skilled and unskilled. In this way they 
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made themselves irreplaceable. Naturally, som~ are leaving the Gulf with the present 
recession, but their penetration is everywhere to be easily done with. 
5. East Asians: mainly Koreans, Philippinos and Thai. They appeared on the Gulf 
working force very late in the 70's. South Koreans started organized recruits in big 
groups in Saudia then other Gulf States. Philippinos and Thai are recruited 
individually and as such survive in several corners of life. 
Table 5 and the two figures 1 and 2 illustrat~s the population situation and its 
components. Figure 1 gives a quick appreciation of the working force in the Gulf, while 
figure 2 tries to give an analytical view of a specific case. 
G.C.C. Economic Features: 
Main G.C.C. economic potential and production in order of importance, are mineral; 
industrial and agricultural. Mineral means oil, associated and non-associated gas. 
Industry means only modern manufacture industry and does not include any traditional 
handicraft. Agriculture means cultivation of whatever crops and rearing animals only on 
modern principles. Yet, agriculture should include palm-groves which characterise 
wide-spread traditional oasis cultivation because they are ecologically best suited to the 
area. 
But in between mineral and industrial shares of the GNP lies the whole spectrum of 
tertiary economies from public sector to trade, transport, banking and domestic house 
services. 
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TABLE 5 
G.C.C. Economic Figures (1985) 
] Origin of GNP (%) 'iii Employment (%) ~ .. J ~ .. Per ~~ ~ ~~ 0 i! i! 1i Capita i-- .r .; j ~ i.- ... .; j ! State GNP GNP :§ ·e 'ti. -1 ~ .. )! Iii Bn. US$ ,000 $ <!i: ~ 
..Jl ~ ~ ..Jl 
Bahrain 3.24 (81) 8.9 1 25 
-
20 
-
54 5 1 ~ 34 
-
60 
4.12 (83) 10.5 1 .... 45 -4--- 5 
-
35 
-
3.87 (86) 9.0 1 15 ~ 20 ... 64 2 0.5 13 36 48 
Kuwait 32.90 (81) 22.7 1 30 -I> 26 ~ 43 2 4 
-
30 ~ 44 32.84 (83) 19.9 1 
-I> 61 2 
-
34 ~
20.50 (86) 11.0 0.5 50 6 3.5 42 2 1 9 19 69 
Oman 5.74 (81) 5.5 7 67 
-
6 ~ 20 58 3 
-+ 7 ~ 32 6.97 (83) 6.1 60 4 10 
-+-8.54 (86) 6.6 3 48 11 39 82 3 
-
7 
-
10 Qatar 7.19 (81) 27.6 2 60 ~ 10 ~ 28 12 5 
-
15 ~ 68 
5.96 (83) 20.0 1 ~ 85 -E- 3 ~ 17 +-3.95 (86'14 11.4 1 46 6.5 7 40 12 5 ~ 15 ~ 68 
U.A.E. 27.30 (81) 27.3 2 58 ~ 15 ~ 25 5 4 ~ 11 4- 80 
23.72 (83) 20.0 1 4 77 +-- 5 -+ 15 
-
21.50 (86) 15.0 1 48 10 9 34 5 2 8 27 58 
Saudi Arabia 158.63 (82) 12.6 2 50 
-
15 .... 33 33 2 .... 20 
-
45 
92.93 (84184) 8.6 3 34 9 14 41 
82.70 (86) 7.8 5 23 
-
20 ~ 52 40 2 ~ 20 ~ 38 
Sources: 
- Figures and percentages for 1981 and 1983 and Saudi figures and percentages for 1982, 1984-85 are after 'Fischer Welt 
Almanach' 1983 to 1989. 
- GNP and per capita GNP figures for 1986 and Saudi employment percents of 1986 are after 'Atlas Economique Mondial, 
1988'. 
- Percents of origin of GNP and employment for 1986 are calculated on figures and values after the 'Middle East and North 
Africa Yearbook 1987'. 
N.B. Figures of above quoted sources are based on statistics of the World Bank, the secretariat of the OECD and EEC. 
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Roughly the shares of the aforementioned sectors in the formation of the GNP of the 
G.C.C. countries may be as follows: 
Oil 
Sector % of GNP 
Mineral (Oil) 
Tertiary Economics 
Industry 
Agriculture & Primary 
1983 1986 
50- 60 
30- 35 
5 - 10 
1 - 2 
30 - 50 
35 - 45 
5 - 10 
1 - 3 
The importance of oil, not only as the net earner, but also as the motivator of the 
emergence of Modem Statehood in the Gulf, need not be ascertained. Table 6 
summarises oil situation of the Gulf. Figures 3 and 4 show the vulnerability of Gulf 
economy, leaning heavily on oil export earnings, is experiencing a hard financial and 
developmental decade. 
The oil region actually lies on and off shore from Kuwait to the U.A.E. The Eastern 
Saudi province is the only oil Saudi region. Though a Saudi pipeline was built to the Red 
Sea, since 1982, the Gulf is the main oil sea way for all G.C.C. countries plus Iran and 
Iraq. 
The vital role of Saudia in oil economics is attested by table 6. Saudi halves the oil 
produced by all the G.C.C. members, monopolises one third of all world oil exports and 
sits on top of world oil reserves (25% of proven reserves 1988 i.e. 34 Bn. tons out of 134 
Bn tons of proven world reserves). Furthermore Gulf oil is predicted to live up to nearly 
125 years at the present rate of consumption, while predictions give only 8 years for U.S. 
oil reserves. 
It is true that the G. C. C. produced oil was only 11% of world production in 1985 (oil 
glut years)(7), yet its world market share is in the range of 45-50%. This being so due to 
the thinly-populated G.C.C. countries which produces a huge surplus for world trade. In 
any case, the Gulf region (G.C.C. plus Iraq and Iran) is the highest provider of marketed 
oil in the world (60%), hence its (a) importance in world strategies, (b) its huge proven 
oil reserves and longivity, in addition to moderate gas reserves (see table 6) extends the 
strategic importance of the Gulf into the future, and (c) its vital role in the modem 
money market and Gulf industry. 
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TABLE 6 
Oil and Gas statistics, Gulf and world 
Oil production million tons, 
Oil reserves in billion tons, 
Gas reserves in billion cubic meters. 
Cotmtry on Prod•dion 
- Repon 1'.185 1987 87% 
of World 
Saudi a 165 209 7.1 
U.A.E. 60 72 2.5 
Kuwait 50 61 2.1 
Oman 24 28 0.9 
Qatar 15 15 0.5 
Bahrain 2 2 
Total GCC 316 387 13.3 
Iran 110 112 3.8 
Iraq 70 101 3.4 
Total Gulf 494 601 20.6 
Total World 2778 2907 100.0 
Sources: 
(Tons) 
22.8 
12.9 
12.6 
0.5 
0.5 
48.4 
12.5 
13.3 
74.2 
120.6 
Resenres 1987 
on Gu 
'l'o World ( ... ) 'l'o World 
19 3700 3.6 
11 2950 2.9 
10.5 1166 1.1 
0.4 N.A. 
0.4 4304 4.5 
40.1 12340 11.5 
10.3 13850 12.9 
11.0 755 0.7 
61.5 26945 25.1 
100.0 107500 100.0 
- Fischer Welt Almanach, Year Books 1985-89, and Atlas Economique Mondial, 1985-88. See also GOIG No: 34 1988 (pp. 
136-154) where 1985 gas proven reserves augmented but little and a certain constancy is observed in GCC share of gas 
reserves. 
Industry 
The model advocated by western consultants was to use the cheap power source of 
associated gas to create an industrial base in the Gulf. This was well received among Gulf 
authorities as it relieves their region from the monopoly of crude oil exports to an 
unpredicted market. It was also advocated that industry would, not only diversify 
economy, but also would create a partly local origin of GOP; it would create jobs in 
administration and production, and facilitate acquiring technology by transfer and 
training. In short industry was the motto of the 70's in the Gulf. Big to huge State-owned 
plants arose everywhere and there was a yearly augmentation of productive capacities all 
over the Gulf. The pattern was to start with chemical fertilizer plants, cement, 
petro-chemicals, and ending up with iron and steel. This was done in Qatar, Saudia, and 
the U .A. E. Kuwait had a middle-of-the road policy between State and private industrial 
enterprise, and Oman certainly (and perhaps for lack of huge finance similar to other 
G.C.C.) was encouraging the private sector. Bahrain, while being orientated to services, 
especially banking and regional transport, was being helped by richer G.C.C. neighbours 
in erecting certain industries e.g. Aluminium and the dry docks. 
Certainly some industries were successfully fulfilling its aims; refining, cement and 
down-stream industries e.g. plastics, partly satisfied the local market needs of each 
country. This was not the case in other industries especially petro-chemicals and iron and 
steel which were originally planned for world and/or regional market. Protectionism and 
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competitiveness are major causes for such dismaying situations where huge sums were 
invested. Agreements within the G.C.C. are needed to do away with competition of local 
similar products and to organise whatever possible to keep industrial unprofitability at its 
minimum. Table K shows that industrial capacity in petro-chemicals of the G.C.C. (plus 
Iraq) are alarmingly high and puts the area again at the mercy of world market trends, 
coupled with prolectionist policies of West Europe and other advanced countries. 
To sum up industry is playing a role (table 7) in thct. GOP, but not comparable to the 
high investment and the previously propagated ideas of economic balances of the Gulf 
countries. 6.3% as the share of industry in the GOP is not much, but could be a base for 
wiser industrial development of the economy - pushing further needed and profitable 
products, and establishing a drive in third world markets, especially in fertilisers and 
other petro-chemicals. 
TABLE 7 
Values of manufacture production and military expenditure (1983 & 1987) 
Slide GOP Mullfadue Mllhuy Expeaditlue 
Bu.$ MD.$ %GOP Per MD.$ %GOP Per 
c.pita c.pila 
Ia$ Ill$ 
Bahrain 
1983 4.9 546 11.1 1366 266 5.3 655 
1987 3.5 491 14.3 1090 170 4.1 346 
Kuwait 
1983 21.0 1375 6.5 811 1700 8.0 1002 
1987 21.7 2973 13.7 1564 1535 5.2 714 
Oman 
1983 8.0 126 1.5 111 1595 19.7 1411 
1987 7.7 300 3.9 200 1784 23.3 1235 
Qatar 
1983 6.4 380 5.9 1360 N.A. 
1987 5.1 505 9.9 1440 197 3.8 490 
U.A.E. 
1983 30.1 2710 9.0 2258 1660 5.5 1383 
1987 24.1 2270 9.4 1513 1687 7.4 929 
Saudi a 
1983 119.2 6939 5.8 667 21927 18.4 2108 
1987 13.5 6100 8.3 488 10600 12.8 710 
Sowces: 
- GOIG 1986 for the 1983 values of the GDP, manufacture and percents, GIB 1989 for the 1987 values of GDP, manufacture 
acd percents, SIPRI 1985 for the military expenditures of 1983, and Encyclopaedia Universalis 1990 for military figures for 
1987. 
N.B.: Also consulted were 'Atlas Economique' Paris 1988, Fischer Almanach (several years) and 'The Middle East & North 
Africa 1987' (Europa Publications). A great deal of divergence is observed concerning GDP, GNP and manufacture 
values among these sources due to different computations and scope delineating manufacture, GDP, etc. There is a 
greater difficulty concerning military figures owing to the security factor practised by all countries in these matters. It is 
safer to assume, from the outset, that military figures are indicators rather than accurate spending. 
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TABLE 8 
Petrochemical Production Capacities (1987) 
(Thousand Ton/Year) 
Commodity 
Ethylene 
Methanol 
Ethanol 
Ethylene Glycol 
Styrene 
LOPE 
HOPE 
Ammonia 
Source: 
Gulf Production 
(1987) 
2,271 
1,580 
281 
655 
435 
870 
260 
5,430 
Share In World's 
Capacity (%) 
3.87 
14.52 
7.00 
8.21 
6.98 
3.57 
2.59 
11.4 
- AI Moajil, A.H., "Industrialisation: Gateway to Development in the Arab Gulf Region" GOIC, No. 26, Doha 1986. 
Agriculture 
Climatic constraints and lack of favourable soils for agriculture are responsible for the 
negligible agricultural wealth. On the average -1% of G.C.C. land is cultivable, and less 
than 0.5% is cropped. 
TABLE 9 
Agricultural Figures 
Country Estimatioa 
Of Cropped Area 
Hip Low 
,000 Hecflll"e 
% Of Cotlldry Area 
UDder Crop Cllltivllllle 
Hip Low 
Saudi a 1105 400 0.5 0.18 1.8 Oman 42 40 0.2 0.19 0.25 U.A.E. 15 13 0.18 0.15 0.24 Qatar 3.7 3.4 0.32 0.29 2.5 Bahrain 3 2 4.8 3.2 9.0 Kuwait 3 1 0.16 0.05 1.12 
Total G.C.C. 1171.7 459.4 0.47 0.18 1.6 % Saudia of 
Total G.C.C. 94.3% 87% 96.8% 
Source: 
- Arab Agriculture 1985; M. Kay, pp. 26-32, for high estimate and H. Bowen-Jones, pp. 36-41 for low estimates and 
cultivable area. 
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Assuming the reliability of these figures, Saudia owns around 90% of the available 
G.C.C. agricultural resources, and 97% of the potential arable land- an asset of its 
huge area. 
Shortage of food was sensed as an acute need in the late 70's, when development and 
growth in the Gulf necessitated increasing immigrant manpower (naturally as expatri-
ates). Local food habits also changed, and the end result was an increasing imported food 
bills. Table 10 shows a high, probably the highest, per capita food imports. The Omani 
peasantry is not yet affected, hence the comparatively lower imports value. 
TABLE 10 
G.C.C. Countries: 
Food & Agricultural Imporis, 1983-86 
Imports as Value of Imports Imports Per 
State %of GNP ID Millioa US S Capita, us s 
1983 1986 1983 1986 1983 1986 
Bahrain 5.0 8.0 210 316 500 718 
Kuwait 3.1 5.0 890 1060 508 573 
Oman 5.8 5.0 404 456 342 370 
Qatar 2.8 5.8 168 230 580 657 
U.A.E. 3.0 4.1 711 879 547 597 
Saudi a 4.7 4.5 5221 3721 479 298 
Total & Average 7604 6662 480 385 
Solii'Ce: 
Atlas Economique 1985 & 1988. 
Addressing this situation a policy was propagated for development of agriculture. 
Government experimental farms were created, and government subsidies to the private 
sector were more than generous. Vegetables and poultry farms were successful and a 
certain percentage of local needs are satisfied. But the staple grain, i.e. rice, had to be 
imported. 
The lesser G.C.C. countries had to import all other grains, meat, dairy products and 
other food items including Saudi poultry and wheat. 
The spectacular success of Saudi agriculture, which was termed "the greening of 
Arabia", is worth mentioning. As refered above, the probabilities of growth in Saudi are 
greater due to size and different ecological regions.<8> 
The underground water reservoir in Saudia is far greater and complex, and may permit 
cultivation to go through the 21st century if agriculture is kept at a reasonable pace or, 
much better, if it freezes to the present 1/2 million ha. of cultivation. We know the lesson 
of extravaganza and the quick depletion of underground water sources, the replenish-
ment of which, in an arid climate, is not feasible. 
Huge government subsidies to private peasants and producing companies changed 
Saudia from a net importer of wheat to a net exporter of surplus; from 150,000 tons in 
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1979 the wheat production rose to nearly 2.3 million tons in 1986. The consumption is 
around one million, which leaves 1.3 million tons for export, a difficult task in present 
day wheat world market, unless granted to poor countries. Saudi silos are over stocked. 
To check production the government announced, early in 1987, that 30% of wheat land 
should be converted to barley to ease the wheat surplus and to cut on some barley 
imports which reached 5 mo. tonnes in 1986. The government also guaranteed purchase 
of barley at around $.270 a ton. It remains to be seen if this is sufficient motivator if we 
remember that the government pays $.550 per wheat ton to the Saudi producers. 
Wheat, poultry and dairy products are competitive Saudi products in the lesser G.C.C. 
markets, much to the detriment of local producers. In Kuwait some protectionist 
attitudes were implemented in the interest of Kuwaiti poultry farmers. 
Anyway, producing food is a good policy. But a better policy is not to disturb the Gulf 
fragile ecology to an irrecoverable degree. 
Conclusion 
Summing up, the G.C.C. advantageous land size, oil wealth and financial power, are 
offset by a markedly thin population. This necessitated a big mass of expatriates 
amounting to 45% of the total population of G. C. C. countries- an unhealthy situation. 
It may result in ethnic trouble, or uneasy situations often pointed out by the intelligentsia 
and the Media of the region. G.C.C. sociologists notably show concern about culture 
infusions of several streams: Indian and Far East in particular. <9> Among the 
politically-minded Gulf people the case of Indian Nepalese ethnic relations focuses 
attention. 
Furthermore, the area is not far away from contestant puritanical and fundamentalist 
ideas with a possible change of the direction of the development course, e.g., the 
embryonic ideas of an Islamic banking system. 
On a world strategic perspective the G.C.C. countries, and the Gulf region at large, 
are at another disadvantage, i.e., its location on the friction zone between the two world 
Powers. In a divided world,the G.C.C. States choose not to adhere to any pact or 
alliance, e.g. Baghdad or Cento which included two neighbour states, namely Iraq and 
Iran. With the exception of their membership in the Arab League, Islamic Conference 
and the G.C.C., there are no published clauses on defence and military agreements that 
could be analysed. Certainly there are treaties between individual G.C.C. States and 
Western Powers. Oman and Britain have a long standing defence commitment, but how 
far reaching is not ascertained. The same analysis applies to Bahrain and U.S. marine 
communication facilities. 
This unclear situation may be due to a persistant Western preoccupation with the 
Northern Tier, i.e., Turkey and Iran as their primary military task in the Middle East. 
When, during this decade, Iran fell out of the western geostrategies, the West recurred to 
its naval strategy without a need to formalise new arrangements with the G.C.C. States. 
The RDF (Rapid Deployment Force) presence in the Gulf during the hostage crisis in 
Iran, was denied any Saudi base<10>, and Oman publicly refused any involvement during 
the Iraq-Iran war. The situation is, on the whole, full of paradoxes: pro West economic 
ties, armament and policies, yet non-aligned and not involved due to ambiguities in 
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Super Power's policies vis-a-vis Gulf regional Powers, e.g., Iran or Iraq. Yet, when Iraq 
militarily annexed Kuwait (for a short seven month time), G.C.C. politics changed at 
once. Vital world interests (especially Western) in the Gulf- ranging from oil to the 
keeping of the status quo of the political map of the region (at least for the time being) -
prompted a Western-led U.N. and G.C.C. action to restore previous status. At the end 
of the day, these events would enhance new arrangements in the region based, at least, 
on an emerging defence system with a probable active Western participation. 
NOTES: 
1. Jobert, M., 1981, 'Oil Prospects in the Gulf, p. 108. 
2. These axis are: a) the East-West axis extending from Dammam on the Gulf to Jeddah on the Red Sea, 
including the Riyadh metropolitan area and Nejd plateau; and b) the North-South axis parallel to the Red 
Sea extending from the Holy Places of Islam in Hijaz (Mecca and Medina) along with port cities of Jeddah 
and Yanbu southwards to the rich Asir plateau on the borders of Yemen. 
3. There were oil geopolitics before the 1970's, especially during the Iranian oil crisis of the 1950's, but they 
were usually stabilised by Western policies and oil monopolies. The attainment of independence of many 
oil-producing countries, the formation of OPEC and OAPEC organisations and the national aspirations in 
the Gulf vis their vital oil resources, coupled with conflict and strife in the Arab Mid-East and repeated war 
with Israel - all helped to formulate oil geopolitics of the 70's and 80's. 
4. The military expenditure (at constant price figures of 1980 exchange rate) of Saudia rose from US $.6.8 bn. 
in 1975 to a peak of 25.4 bn. in 1982, constituting 51% of all Middle East armament bills. However, the 
Saudi expenditure receded gradually to circa $.16 bn. for 1987. Likewise, other G.C.C. States raised their 
expenditure on armament (and a parallel raise in defence budgets). For an appreciation of the huge arms 
budgets see table 7 in the text. The ebb and flow of military expenditure may correlate to the activation 
spasms of the Gulf war. Yet military spendings still constitute a very high ratio of the GNP of Saudia and 
Oman; they virtually stand at the top of such ratios worldwide. 
5. See M. Riad 1986, 'Geo-politics and politics in the Arab Gulf States'. 
6. For a fuller history of economic conditions and foreign guest-workers before oil economics, see M. Riad 
1984 'The Gulf and its People Prior to 1930'. 
7. During the peak of world oil high prices, the G.C.C. share of world production was 22% in 1980. Now it 
may account only of about half that ratio due to world oil glut and higher non-Opec production. 
8. Thompson, P.C. & W. Bakiewicz 1985, 'Saudi Arabia' in 'Arab Agriculture'. This chapter includes a good 
account of agriculture boom and water capabilities - mostly the underground reservoir - in Saudia. 
9. For readings on the problems of expatriates in the G.C.C. countries, consult various writings of M.G. 
EI-Rumaihi, A. Kh. Al-Kawari, G.S. AI-lsa, I.Y. AI-Qotb, etc. 
10. Ziring, L., 1984, 'The Middle East Political Dictionary' pp. 344-345. Also consult in the bibliographical list 
writings of Andreasyan, Chubin, EI-Rumaihi and Hanks. 
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